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v. Responsible Choices for all Adults Coalition, 2007 Guam 20 ¶26. The issuance of a writ of
mandamus is an extraordinary remedy employed in extreme situations. A.B. Won Pat Guam Int'l
Airport Auth. v. Moylan, 2005 Guam 5 ¶ 10.

5 The first issue, therefore, is whether, at the time mandate was sought, the Governor was 6 under a clear, present and usually ministerial duty to compensate the Petitioners with the funds 7 for the purpose of paying them in accordance with 10 Guam Code Ann. § 55102(e). It is not 8 denied that if the Governor was under such a duty, then the rest of the Respondents were under 9 consequential-and equally compellable-duties to perform the remaining official acts prayed for 10 in this proceeding. The other issues before the court are whether the Petitioners assert facts 11 sufficient to support the conclusion that they lack a plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law and 12 13 whether they exhausted their administrative remedies.

As stated above, Respondents argue that Petitioners are not entitled to a writ of mandate
requiring them to pay Petitioners the ten percent (10%) salary increase because there is no funding
authorizing such pay. Respondents point to the lack of appropriation by the Legislature as the
reason why the Petitioners have not received their third ten percent (10%) increment as required
by 10 Guam Code Ann. § 55102(e).

I. Whether the Respondents are under a clear, present, and usually ministerial duty.

Mandamus cannot issue to compel an officer to satisfy an obligation for which no
appropriation exists. *Griefen v. Treasurer and Receiver-General*, 459 N.E.2d 451, 452 (Mass.
1983). Under the Organic Act, the legislative power is vested in the "Legislature of Guam." 48
U.S.C. § 1423a. The power to appropriate money is expressly reserved to the Legislature. 48
U.S.C. § 1423j(a). Thus, pursuant to the Organic Act, "the Legislature has plenary or absolute

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corporation or agency to perform an act involving the expenditure of money, it must affirmatively
appear that there are funds available for that purpose. *Sutro Heights Land Co. v. Merced Irr. Dist.*,
211 Cal. 670, 703-04 (1931).

In the case at bar, Respondents' duty to pay was dependent upon there being an appropriation of money to fund the government of Guam's obligation under 10 Guam Code Ann.
§ 55102(e) for the 2011 fiscal year. If none was made, the Respondents are not under a clear, present and ministerial duty to comply with Public Law 29-105 because they did not have the money to do so. The court agrees with the Respondents that Petitioners are not entitled to a writ of mandate requiring them to pay Petitioners the ten percent (10%) salary increase because there is no funding authorizing such pay.

Thus, the only other ways the court can meet the Petitioners' requests are by (1)
compelling the Legislature to appropriate funds or (2) ordering the appropriation of money from
already existing funds. However, as will be discussed below the former would be a violation of
the doctrine of separation of powers and the latter is neither legally possible or feasible.

The separation of powers doctrine exists to prevent the abuses that can flow from 18 centralization of power. In re Request of Governor Carl T.C. Guiterrez, 2002 Guam 1 ¶ 33 (citing 19 20 Mo. Coalition for Env't Joint Comm. On Admin. Rules, 948 S.W.2d 125, 132 (Mo. 1997) (en 21 banc)). The Guam Supreme Court has recognized that under the separation of powers doctrine, 22 one branch is prohibited from either delegating its enumerated powers to another branch of the 23 government or aggrandizing its powers by reserving for itself the power given to another branch. 24 Id. at ¶ 35. Furthermore, even absent a finding that one branch has usurped a power exclusively 25 reserved for another branch, a separation of powers violation may be found if one branch unduly 26

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this rule exists. A court may order appropriate expenditures from already existing funds if the 2 3 funds are reasonably available for the expenditures in question, which means that the purposes 4 for which those funds were appropriated are generally related to the nature of costs incurred. see 5 Butt v. State of California, 4 Cal.4th 668, 698-703 (Cal. 1992). This exception must be strictly 6 construed and is inapplicable if the existing funds have been appropriated for other purposes. Id. 7 Moreover, a trial court has broad discretion to determine whether a mandamus remedy requiring 8 a particular payment from an existing fund is warranted under the totality of the circumstances. 9 County of San Diego, at 599. 10

Here, the petition for writ of mandate does not allege, nor is there any proof, as to the
existence of any surplus funds from which payment of the Petitioners' claims could be made at
the present time. However, in Petitioners' reply brief to the second declaration of Bertha Duenas,
they suggest that their claim could be paid for by using the money put forward in Public Law 30196, which provides funding for each agency. More specifically, Petitioners assert that the money
appropriated to pay for salaries, increments, promotions, special pay, benefits etc... can be used
to pay them in accordance with 10 Guam Code Ann. § 55102(e).

19The court does not agree for the following reasons. First, the existing funds referred to by20the Petitioner have been appropriated for other purposes. Thus, if the court ordered the21Respondents to take away funds that have been appropriated for the specific purposes of paying22salaries, overtime, specialty pay benefits and so forth, then the money already appropriated would23be insufficient to pay both the regular salaries and the ten percent (10%) compensation increase.24Furthermore, the estimated cost of implementing the third increment of the law enforcement pay25raise is over \$5 million. The Petitioners did not present any specific evidence regarding the

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in this jurisdiction to fulfill the requirement that there be an inadequate remedy at law: "The inconvenience of proceeding to what may be an unnecessary trial has long been recognized as one of the hardships of litigation in our judicial system, but such hardship does not measure up to the inconveniences which would result if piecemeal appeals were permitted." *Limitaco* v. *Guam Fire Dept*, at ¶ 19 (citing *Gulf Research & Dev. Co. v. Harrison*, 185 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1951)). Thus, the Supreme Court found that inconvenience is insufficient to justify mandamus. *Id.*

Furthermore, the Guam Supreme Court reviewed a mandamus action in Limtiaco v. Guam 10 Fire Dept., to compel the Guam Fire Department to comply with a Civil Service Commission 11 12 order filed as a result of an employee grievance alleging that petitioner was entitled to back pay 13 which he was never paid. That case was a mandamus action to compel the Guam Fire Department 14 to perform a ministerial act, i.e., comply with the Civil Service Commission's order awarding 15 back pay. The Supreme Court held that the Petitioner had exhausted his administrative remedies 16 at law by filing a grievance under Chapter 12 of the Department of Administration Personnel 17 Rules and Regulations, *Limitiaco*, at ¶ 21. 18

19 The court agrees with the Petitioners that grievance proceedings or filing a civil suit is
20 inconvenient and may take in excess of six months. However, the Supreme Court has held that
21 inconvenience is insufficient to justify mandamus. see Limitiaco v. Guam Fire Dept, at ¶ 19. The
22 Petitioners have also not proven that they lack the remedy of a civil suit under the Government
23 Claims Act or that they lack any other remedies. Thus, the court finds that the Petitioners have
24 not proven that they lack a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law because inconvenience is
26 not enough to justify mandamus. Furthermore, there is no evidence that Petitioners filed any

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1 grievances with the Respondents or the Department of Administration. Thus, unlike Limitiaco, 2 3 where the Supreme Court held that the Petitioner had exhausted his administrative remedies at 4 law by filing a grievance under Chapter 12 of the Department of Administration Personnel Rules 5 and Regulations, this court finds that the Petitioners have failed to exhaust their administrative 6 remedies because they did not first bring the matter before the Department of Administration. 7 CONCLUSION 8 Having heard arguments on this motion and having received and considered all of the 9 evidence presented, the court finds that no duty exists because of the lack of appropriation by the 10 Legislature. The court also finds that the Petitioners have failed to prove that they lack of any 11 12 plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law and that Petitioners failed to exhaust their 13 administrative remedies. Based on the foregoing, the Petitioners' request is DENIED. 14 15 SO ORDERED, this 22 day of April 2011. 16 17 ZJ. JOBUALLO 18 19 HONOBÁBLE MICHAEL J. BORDALLO Judge, Superior Court of Guam 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 2 Page 10 of 10